Abstract-More and more Internet services are hosted b y Content Distribution Networks or Cloud operators. Often, IP addresses are reused for several services, and the mapping between domain names and IPs has become highl y agile. This complicates the anal y sis of monitoring data, as it is not clear an y more which IP address represents which service at which time. We propose a s y stem that continuousl y monitors this activit y using captured DNS packets in a large network. Thereb y we are able to (i) understand the allocation strategies inside a hosting provider, and (ii) report significant changes that are not due the normal agilit y of a particular service. We evaluate our s y stem using a 2-weeks data set from a large network operator, and demonstrate how it can be used to find malicious sites.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) is an essential Internet enabler that decouples a service's identifier from the infras tructure hosting it. This is being extensively used today, most prominently in the form of content delivery networks (CDNs) and cloud computing platforms. Service providers take ad vantage of the availability of virtually unlimited resources, to which exceeding traffic volume can be dynamically offloaded at peak load by activating them via additional DNS resolutions. While traditional static name-to-IP mappings are still being widely used, in particular for small and medium enterprises, the use of these agile mappings is on the rise.
This increased agility raises the bar for insightful network monitoring and maintenance. IP addresses for which the hosted service changes spontaneously are hard to classify by network monitoring tools, with respect to the type of service they host. On the other hand, services that are hosted redundantly at various physical locations are difficult to grasp at the IP level, and complicate widely used techniques like white /blacklisting of certain services, as well as Quality of Service (QoS) approaches. Unfortunately, different service operators use different hosting strategies, and different hosting providers assign IP addresses to services based on different strategies.
In this paper, we aim at resolving this confusion for the subset of domains for which we observe DNS query responses on the wire. Our goals are in particular (i) to derive an aggregate representation that groups related domain names and IP address ranges, and (ii) to report changes in these mappings. Real-world DNS activity complicates this, as can be seen from the following two examples for assigning domain names and IP addresses in practice: a) Limited Visibility: The popular blogging platform Tumblr assigns to its users domain names following the
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University of Vienna Faculty of Computer Science Vienna, Austria Email: wilfried.gansterer@univie.ac.at pattern {account-name} .tumblr.com. Despite the fact that there are millions of accounts, of course not all of them are frequently queried from within the monitored network, and therefore we simply rarely see them. Instead of storing a continuously changing list of Tumblr domains mapping to Tumblr's IP addresses, and continuously reporting changes, we rather want to extract the more useful information that < something> . t umblr. com> is using this IP range. b) Wildcards: In a previous work [1], we found that Facebook uses domains with the format {X}. {Y} .
channel. facebook. com, where X and Y are always numbers (e.g., 01371354742.6 7. channel. facebook. com). In a two-hour time bin, we observed 54,691 such domains, which mapped to a set of 28 IP addresses. In the fol lowing time bin, we found 80,416 new such domains, mapping to the same IP addresses. Clearly there is no value in keeping track of (and storing!) all these domains, but rather we want to understand the pattern which these domain names follow. Ide ally, we would like to derive automatically the wildcard DNS mapping (i.e., * . channel. facebook. com) that Facebook most likely uses for these IPs.
We propose DNSMap, a system that adaptively extracts the dominant patterns of domain names for an IP range from DNS query responses captured from the wire, and takes the problems of limited visibility and DNS wildcards into account. Furthermore, it merges neighboring IP addresses when they seem to host similar services, in order to provide an aggregated view on which family of services uses which range of IPs in a network. This representation can then be used for "zooming in" on a particular service in a larger network, e.g. for targeted QoS optimizations. On top of that, we present an approach that allows for detecting significant changes in the global DNS zones, i.e. such mappings that differ sufficiently from the previous ones according to a divergence metric we define. Fig. 1 shows an example of the information our system derives. In this case (created from a real-world data set), the system's output conveys the information that on three subsequent IP addresses a set of related domain names is hosted. These domains cluster in four groups, for which the system derived group labels. Would we now observe a new domain name mapping to this IP range, that does not "fit" to any of the identified groups, the system would report this as an unusual event. On the other hand, domain names that differ only slightly from the ones seen before, are absorbed by DNSMap, and are not reported. The main contributions of this paper are: (i) We discuss a methodology for assessing the similarity of domain names and propose a clustering approach that automatically derives labels for sets of domain names. By construction, the method guarantees that for each domain there is at least one label that is sufficiently similar to the domain itself. (ii) We present the DNSMap model which efficiently stores DNS mappings, by compressing the domains mapping to a particular IP range, and merging related IP ranges. Our analysis considers the entire domain name, not just the most significant suffix. (iii) We evaluate the DNSMap system using a DNS data set from a large operator network. We demonstrate how DNSMap can be employed to detect changes in the global DNS configuration, e.g. for detecting malicious activities.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to Weimer's widely used system for passive DNS replication from captured traffic data [2] . Weimer describes an approach for inferring the global DNS zone data, as it is stored in the individual authoritative name servers, from passively monitoring a network link. This mainly addresses the problem that complete zone information for a domain cannot be directly requested from nameservers, due to access restric tions. The SIE pDNS initiative (https://sie.isc. org) implements Weimer's approach, and offers a platform for sharing DNS information. SIE operates several data feeds called channels for distributing the received DNS data in various aggregated/filtered ways. Our system can be thought of as a potential additional channel, that compresses raw DNS data and optimizes the representation to find related IP addresses and allows for enhanced discovery of changes.
Bermudez et al.
[3] use DNS information to relate IP addresses to Internet services, and extract e.g. information about how many and which CDNs host a specific service name. Furthermore, their DN-Hunter automatically derives tags from the domain names observed for an IP, and labels the following (non-DNS) packets accordingly, so to provide additional information about the type of service behind that IP to the system's user. In contrast, our approach considers the inverse: we provide information about the entirety of services hosted at a range of IP addresses. We find structure in the domain names mapping there, by assessing their similarity. This allows us, e.g., to evaluate how sub-ranges of CDNs are used, and enables the detection of DNS configuration changes. This can be used to reveal malware activity, which is not considered by DN-Hunter.
We presented initial experiments for assessing the dynamics of DNS activity in [1] . We discussed a system that attempts to group domain names (based on equal suffixes) and IP addresses (in identical networks). We found that only few mappings can be grouped in this way, and consider DNSMap a significant evolution of this previous approach, that overcomes most of the previous limitations.
Several approaches employ DNS information to detect mal ware activity. EXPOSURE [5] uses machine learning on a large set of features extracted from DNS query responses. The system requires whitelisting, as many legitimate sites are not distinguishable from malicious ones in terms of these features. NOTOS [6] defines five DNS network profiles and assigns each observed domain name to one of these profiles by clustering using similar features as EXPOSURE, plus additional ones (e.g., the Autonomous System (AS) of IP addresses), to ultimately derive a reputation score for each domain. The profiles are based on training the system using a set of blacklists and whitelists. We believe that both these systems could take advantage of DNSMap, as our approach captures which domains are to be expected per IP range, and describes the level of agility that is normal for it.
III. METHODOLOGY
In the following we adopt the established DNS terminology (see, e.g. [6] ): we consider mappings between fully qualified domain names (FQDNs, or short domains) and IP addresses hosting them. Two FQDNs are colliding when they map to the same IP address. We refer to the A-th level of an FQDN as A-LD, e.g. the l-LD (top-level-domain, TLD) of www. example. org is org, the 2-LD is example, and the 3-LD is www. Note however that we use a regularly updated list of top-level domains I to identify l-LD, i.e. the l-LD of yahoo. co. uk is co. uk and not uk.
Our work is based on the assumption that a certain degree of "redundancy" can be found in DNS mappings. That is, we expect that colliding domain names are often similar, and that neighboring IP addresses host similar sets of domain names. As a first step to modeling this, we require a measure of similarity for domain names. Many related approaches [1] directly use the structure of domain names, and group them hi erarchically by increasing A-LD. While this is sufficient to dis cover that www.example.comandwww2.example.com are somewhat similar, it remains unclear how similar they are, and how close e.g. mail. example. com is. Furthermore, www. example. org would not even fall into the same group, as already the TLD "org" falls in a different group than "com", although the domains are obviously highly similar.
We define in the following the DOMAINDIVERGENCE (DD) be the number of domain levels in X (IY I resp.). For each domain level A we first compute a weight w)" based on (i) the hierarchical "importance" of A (i.e., favoring more significant levels with lower A), and (ii) related to the length of the currently compared domain level. The dampening constant ex controls the rate of decrease of w).. with increasing A. Based on our experience, the setting ex = 2 is a good choice, which we use throughout this paper. For each domain level, we further compute a partial domain divergence dd).. between X).. and Y).. , using the well-known Levenshtein Ratio (LR) which is based on counting the necessary edit operations to transform one string into another [7] .
We are now ready to define DD as follows:
Note that this definition assigns higher divergence values to domains that are similar only W.r.t. to some domain levels. One special case is not covered by these definitions. It is in general not clear whether the TLD or the 2-LD contains more important information that is relevant for assessing similarity. Therefore we assign identical weights to them, i.e. we decrease ex by one when A = 2. Fig. 2 shows the computation of DD in detail, and Table I gives some examples.
As a next step, we require a technique for computing labels for a set of domain names V. We derive the generalized median string [8] separately for each domain level, and concatenate them to build the DOMAINMEDIAN of V, which we call the label £ of V. For example, the label of the four domains in Ta ble I is wwa . f ac . a. Obviously, this is a rather poor label, in the sense that it is quite different from all represented domains, as can also be seen by computing the divergences (e.g., DD(£, d1)=0.47 and DD(£, d4)=0.93). 
Listing II shows an unsupervised algorithm to derive the clusters Cj for a set of domains. The algorithm does not require the distance matrix for all domains, but rather continues to evaluate the distances to an intermediate DomainMedian and proceeds in a divide-and-conquer manner. Note line 7: when we cannot further divide the problem, we use k-Means (with k=2) to derive two DomainMedians and continue for each subset separately. When even that fails, i.e. one returned cluster is empty, we return separate clusters for each of the remaining domains (not shown in Listing II). The algorithm does not require us to specify the number of clusters beforehand, but rather continues to further subdivide inhomogeneous ("bad") domains and returns as many clusters as are needed to derive a "good" label for each domain name (i.e., with DD:<:; B).
Recall that some services use DNS wildcards, for which we therefore see a large number of domains mapping to the same set of IP addresses. As these FQDNs are by defnition similar, the clustering procedure will assign them to the same cluster 2 .
Whenever a cluster grows too large (> 30), we "collapse" the cluster, i.e. we remove all domains from it and remember that no domains should be further added to it. This avoids that we bloat the DNSMap with a large number of these domains, but still retains their characteristic pattern as cluster label.
We are now ready to define a central component of our approach, called the IPBlock, which is the basic entity for representing DNS mappings (see Fig. 1 each cluster we store a bit array of length N, which reflects the usage of the IPBlock's IP addresses by this cluster. For example, if the array's first bit is set to "1" this implies that at least one domain in this cluster mapped to the IPBlock's start IP address. We call the cluster then "active", and clarify the reasoning behind this in the following.
A. The DNSMap
The DNSMap is the system's main component and rep resents the global state of DNS mappings, as visible to our monitoring system. It provides a data structure to hold IPBlocks, which are keyed on their start IP address. In order to efficiently store, remove, and search for IPBlocks, we use a set of RBTrees (one per /8 network). The main advantage of such trees in our scenario is their ability to find the IPBlock that contains a certain IP address in logarithmic time, even when the requested IP is not a key in the RBTree. Additionally, the DNSMap maintains a list of contained domain names, which are referenced by the individual blocks. Note that this ensures that there exists only one global instance for each stored domain name, which vastly reduces the memory requirements. In the following, we discuss the main operations of DNSMap. a) Storing a DNS mapping: Table III shows the algo rithm for adding a mapping to the DNSMap. It outputs a status ("OK" or "NEW") and a score value that represents the fit of dname to the IPBlock containing ip. In lines 1-3 we search for the IPBlock that contains ip, and create a new IPBlock if ip is not yet stored. In line 4 we check if either dname is already contained in any cluster of this IPBlock, or has a distance of at most e to a collapsed cluster. In both cases we set the corresponding bit in the cluster's bit array to "1" and return without any further changes. Lines 7-8 show the procedure for creating a first cluster for dname in case the IPBlock is so far completely empty. In case there are already clusters, we find the one which has the label with the smallest divergence to dname (line 9). If it is below the threshold e, the domain is added to the cluster, otherwise a new cluster is created. The output is then further interpreted as a series of events, i.e. all calls to AddMapping that return "NEW " or DD> e are considered changes in the global DNS configuration. b) Merging IPBlocks: Consider two IPBlocks A and 5, which contain WA and Wl3 domains, respectively. From all 4 clusters in A, we select the subset of clusters c-: with labels c-: which satisfy DD(c-:, cff)::; e, for at least one cluster cff of B. The relative share of domains of A th � t "fit" to the cluster configuration of 5 is then O"A , l3 = Lk �' Definition 1 (MERGECONDITION): Two IPBlocks A and 5 are merged iff (i) they are direct neighbors in the IP address space, (ii) they contain IPs from the same Autonomous System, and (iii) 0" A , l3 > I and O"l3 , A > f. In other words, we merge two IPBlocks when at least a percentage I of FQDNs of each IPBlock are in clusters which are similar to the neighboring IPBlock's clusters. We set I = 0.5, i.e. merging requires at least a simple majority of similar domains.
c) Splitting an IPBlock: Consider two IPBlocks A and 5 that were created from a third IPBlock Z such that A represents the first half of Z's IPs and 5 the second half. Let A contain all those domains of Z where the containing cluster was active in A's IP range (and for 5 respectively).
Definition 2 (SPLITCONDlTION): An IPBlock Z is split iff A and 5 do not satisfy MERGECONDlTION. Note that this implicitly implements a divide-and-conquer scheme for iteratively finding the optimal IPBlock configu ration. However, this procedure will of course only converge to stable IPBlocks if the analyzed DNS information by itself "stabilizes". In general we assume that this is not the case, therefore the IPBlocks configuration should constantly evolve, dependent on the observed DNS data and the resulting clusters per IPBlock, i.e. depending on e.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section we sketch the design of a system that uses the DNSMap construction to process DNS mappings. a) Data Processing & Output: The system receives DNS traffic (UDP port 53) from a monitoring probe, which discards responses for which no query was observed, in order to avoid traffic injections, and extracts NOERROR query responses, i.e. those responses that were answered by a DNS resolver and contain one or more address records. A preprocessing module removes duplicate DNS mappings within a time window of 1,800 seconds, as duplicates contain no additional information that would be relevant to our system, but would only increase the load on it. Each queried name and each corresponding IP address (i.e., each mapping) is added to the DNSMap by calling AddMapping. All mappings that returned the status "NEW" or DD>e are considered a significant change, and are written to a text file for further analy sis, as lines with the format <timestamp> <domain-name> <ip> <DD> <count>, where "count" is the number of IP Blocks in which "domain-name" appears. E.g., 1321469613
static.ak.facebook.com 77.67.4.40 0.614 65.
b) Merge, Split, Cleanup: We initiate merging of all IPBlocks in the DNSMap, according to the strategy shown in §III-A. In our experiments, this is done every six hours, which we found to be a good tradeoff between computa tional overhead (merging is costly) and memory requirements (aggregating IPs saves space). The global DNS configuration is subject to continuous changes, with new FQDNs and IPs appearing and disappearing every day (see e.g.
[3]). Therefore we run cleanup operations on the DNSMap at fixed time intervals, to remove outdated FQDNs as well as unused IPBlocks. Further, we regularly evaluate the split condition, so to be able to reflect changes to the global DNS configuration in DNSMap, and set all clusters in all IPBlocks to "not active". In our experiments we run these operations every 24 hours. This is motivated by diurnal changes in the DNS configuration, as large services change DNS mappings depending on the time of day. More aggressive scheduling with even shorter time intervals is therefore considered counter-productive.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the proposed system using a data set DSl from a large network operator. It contains two weeks of DNS queries, with '" l3M unique FQDNs and '" 1.3M unique IP addresses. All experiments are done with a Python implemen tation of DNSMap and a standard desktop PC with 16 GB of main memory. The time required for processing the traces varies depending on the setting of the domain divergence threshold e, but always finished significantly faster than would have been required for real-time analysis. On average, we process one day of data in one hour. We omit a thorough analysis here due to lack of space. We conducted several experiments with varying e, which we also need to omit due to space limitations. For all following analyses we set e = 0.6. In general, lower values for e increase both the precision of the DNSMap representation (more clusters per IPBlock are being created), and the sensitivity to changes in DNS mappings.
We processed DSI and retrieved at the end ",475k IPBlocks storing ",576k IPs and ",2.3M FQDNs. See Fig. 3 for the development of these numbers over time. The most important learning to take from this plot is that the number of IPBlocks stabilizes rather quickly. This is critical for DNSMap, as it influences the depths of the internally used RBTrees, and therefore the IP lookup time (see §III-A). Each IPBlock contained on average 1.28±3.6 clusters. In total, 2,471 clusters (0.4%) were collapsed. These low numbers also speak in favor for the system's performance, as a low number of clusters reduces the memory footprint and few collapsed clusters require us to search seldom for a match between the currently processed FQDN and a cluster (see Ta ble III, line 9).
A. Case Studies
We use DNSMap for analyzing the service deployment strategies for a set of selected ASes. The IPBlock representa tion and the Domain Divergence metric allow us to compare the similarity of IPBlocks within an AS, and ultimately find out which IP ranges are used for hosting similar FQDNs. Two IPBlocks A and B are similar if they contain similar cluster labels. For each cluster label in A (B) we find the label in B (A) such that the DD between the two labels in minimal. The similarity score ss for A and B is then defined as the mean of these divergences. For the sake of better representation, we restrict ourselves to 100 consecutive IPBlocks per AS. Fig. 4 shows the results, with the number of IPs per shown AS being shown in the captions of the figures.
The plots reveal the internal structure of large networks, as is shown in the following examples: (a) Google . This is quite expected from a cloud provider, due to a large number of different sites being hosted at different IPs. DNSMap enables us to "zoom-in" on large networks, and reveal substructures that are used for similar services. The plots represent the DNSMap status after analyzing two weeks of DNS data, and show that even large CDNs exhibit stability patterns. We can use the DNSMap representation to exactly pinpoint the IP ranges for which an FQDN is considered normal, and assign anomaly scores that depend on both the FQDN and the IP address respectively. In contrast to other approaches [5] [6], we would therefore be able to detect that, e.g., www. google. com mapping to a Facebook IP is anomalous. DNSMap produces change event messages in these cases, which we further investigate in the following.
B. Application to Malware Detection
Internet miscreants abuse the DNS to reliably host malicious sites. Fast-Flux is a frequently used technique where the domain-to-IP mappings are quickly rotated, so to assure that a domain is reachable after a particular IP has been taken down. Several variants exist, which all share the concept of highly agile DNS activity. However, as many legitimate services are also agile, differentiating them is hard [5] , [6] . DNSMap absorbs a large amount of the legitimate agility, which is typically characterized by rather stable FQDN patterns, and is confined to a certain set of IP ranges (e.g., in the operator's AS, or in one or more CDNs). Malicious sites "flux" more, and reuse the same IP addresses for a variety of "services". We analyze the change records (see §IV) as output by DNSMap during the last 24 hours of the analysis of DSl. We then focus on records that contain FQDNs for which we observed changes involving IP addresses from at least two different ASes. The remaining IP addresses are then sorted by the number of reports we received for them. We checked the reputation of the top-10 IP addresses using online services 3 and historic blacklists, and found that the majority of IPs host malicious services, many of which are apparently used as links in Spam emails. Table IV shows the results. Note that two legitimate IPs are found. This is not surprising, as malicious services replicate the hosting strategies of legitimate ones (e.g., use of multiple IPs), and therefore often have an identical footprint. However, they can be easily differentiated from the malicious ones, by considering the "count" field in the change reports. This value stores the number of other IPBlocks to which a particular FQDN mapped at the time at which the change was observed. Therefore, the lowest such value that is found for a particular FQDN represents the number of IPBlocks to which the FQDN mapped before the considered 24h window. A large number indicates that the FQDN is "well-known" on many other IPBlocks, and is therefore most likely not malicious. We compute the mean minimum value J.l of "count" for all FQDNs reported at one IP, and observe that it is significantly higher for legitimate IPs (see Table  IV ). Although being simple and limited, this analysis hints at potential applications of DNSMap in malware detection. By exploiting the DNSMap representation it is easier to detect suspicious deviations, as FQDNs that fit to the expected pattern for a particular IP range are automatically absorbed, without requiring any whitelisting of popular services and/or IP ranges.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented DNSMap, a novel scheme for represent ing DNS name-to-IP mappings captured via passive traffic monitoring. We implemented the approach in a prototype system, and evaluated it using a DNS data set from a large operator network. While we think that the initial experiments already show a multitude of possible fields of application, we are convinced that, due to the importance of DNS for the Internet as a whole, we only scratched the surface. The current prototype assesses only the agility of DNS mappings, and still was able to detect, e.g., malicious activity. As a next step we will therefore integrate the system in a larger monitoring framework (with a pDNS-like database), so to be able to access additional information that was previously successfully used by other researchers, like request rates and failed queries.
